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If we take a look to the way the industrial risk 
prevention process was structured in France, we 
will easily distinguish two times: before and after 
the Toulouse accident (September, 2001). 
During the last fifteen years, three aspects where 
classically considered, in France, to prevent the oc-
currence of industrial accidents: reducing risk at its 
source; limiting the effect of an accident; restrain-
ing the consequences of an accident. Regulation 
measures related to these aspects consist in:   
(a).  Risk reduction. Based on Safety Studies (SS), 
this refers to the risk reduction inside the indus-
trial site by choosing the right technical solu-
tions according to the best available ones (ex. 
Reducing quantity of substances, pressure and 
temperature of reactions, etc.) and by setting 
safety barrier up (ex. Installations survey, oper-
ability parameters control, intervention in case 
of default).Thus, the severity and/or the prob-
ability of an accidental even are than reduced.. 
(b).  Public information. Two structures where in-
charge of public information: 
 a regional structures such as “Permanent secre-
tary for the Prevention of Industrial Pollution”. 
This structure bring together locals actors (ex. 
administrations, local authorities, industrialist, 
media, experts, etc.) that have common interest 
in questions dealing with industrial environ-
ment aspects. The aim of this structure is to 
build a trustful climate of dialogue between the 
actors.   a local structure, such as “Local Committee of 
Exchange”, created by Seveso industrialists in 
dialogue with local associations and/or local 
authorities and/or administrations. This struc-
ture allows to: helps the industrialist to have a 
better understanding of resident expectations; 
inform the residents of industrialist constraints 
and recent risk reduction measures. 
(c).  Land use planning. According to the conclu-
sions of the Safety Studies (SS), the land use 
planning was based on a determinist approach 
that consist in taking into account the worse 
consequences of an accidental event that is the 
“consequences without the risk reduction 
measures”.    
(d).  Emergency plans. 
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ABSTRACT: Since the Toulouse accident (2001), the French Authorities have emphasized the position of 
the Safety Study in the risk management process. In this new context induced by the promulgation of the law 
n°2003-699 of 30 July 2003 about the "prevention of the technological and natural risks and to the compen-
sation of the damages", the Safety Studies performed by the industrials is: 1. a demonstration of the risk con-
trol, 2. a support to the urbanization control around Seveso sites using Technological Risk Prevention Plans 
TRPP. Different categories of actors, such as general manager, operators, contractors, central and local Ad-
ministrations, associations, etc., are involved in the risk management process making it more complex. As a 
technical support to decision-makers in risk prevention from both public and private sectors, INERIS plays 
an important role in the evolution of the French risk prevention plan. This paper aims at revealing the differ-
ent decisional and expertise problems faced during the Safety Study and the Technological Risk Prevention 
Plans.  
As we can notice, the 4 aspects presented above 
are based on the Safety Study (SS) and more pre-
cisely on the way “risk analysis process” is per-
formed. The deterministic conclusions consist in 
freezing the urbanisation in the largest diameter that 
represents the worse accidental scenario.  
The Toulouse AZF factory accident related to 
the storage off specification ammonium-nitrate, 
September 21, 2001 revealed the need to go to-
wards a greater control of the risks and their conse-
quences and towards a stronger implication of the 
various stakeholders in the industrial risks preven-
tion process. The Toulouse accident (2001) marks a 
turning in the industrial risk prevention process. In-
deed, with more than 30 deaths in a radius of 500 
meters, thousands of wounded and more than 26000 
residences damaged on a radius of 3 kilometers [1], 
this accident has revealed the following needs: 
1. Control of the risks by acting on their source. 
This mainly consists in improving the way the 
risks control demonstration is carried out within 
the framework of the Safety Studies (SS). 
2. Reduction of the vulnerability around the 
Seveso sites (High Threshold). This consists in 
using natural hazard “Risk Prevention Plans” 
experience feedback to carry out “Technologi-
cal Risk Prevention Plans”. Using the propor-
tionate financial mechanisms, it will become 
possible to limit population exposure to the 
consequences of an accidental event. These 
mechanisms depend on the delimitation of three 
“regulation zones” to limit the present and the 
future building around the Seveso industrial 
sites. 
3. More implication and more dialogue with the 
various actors in the risk prevention process. 
This consists in:   instituting a greater participation of the 
employee in the risks control process, 
with a widening of the Health, Safety 
and Working Conditions Comity 
(HSWCC) missions;  going towards more implication of the 
various actors of risk prevention using 
the Local Committees of Information 
and Dialogue (LCID). 
These three objectives aim at increasing the 
transparency of the risk analysis process, and at go-
ing towards a greater coordination between the dif-
ferent actors in of the preventive risk management 
[2, 3]. 
 
One can notice that the two official documents 
represented by the “Safety Study” and the “Emer-
gency Plan” did not faced major evolution in their 
form and their finality.  
However, the limit between the “demonstration 
of risk control by the industrialist” and the “land 
use planning around the industrial sites” has been 
emphasized: while the first aspect is still the con-
cern of the Safety Study, the second one is done in 
an other document called “ Technological Risk 
Prevention Plan”.    
Moreover, the Technological Risk Prevention 
Plan offers the potentiality of two major modifica-
tions in post-Toulouse French context making the 
technological risk prevention process, in one hand, 
more readable by being aims oriented (demonstra-
tion, land use planning, emergency) but, in an other 
hand, more complex. The following points give 
some aspects of this complexity:   
 The probability of occurrence of the acci-
dental event is now systematically consid-
ered for the land use planning around the 
industrial sites. That was not the case be-
fore the Toulouse accident were a perime-
ter was fixed, around the industrial site, 
without considering the measures set up by 
the industrialist to reduce the risk: This is 
the so called “determinist approach”. Due 
to a lack of experience feedback, the as-
sessment of a probability value to the oc-
currence of an accidental event is difficult 
to find. 
 A level of criticality is obtained for each 
major accidental scenario considering their 
kinetic, their probability of occurrence and 
their intensity. The aggregation of theses 
three aspects for each scenario is compli-
cated to Asses. 
 The various actors concerned by the deci-
sion in the risk prevention process are now 
all consulted. The part and the limit of their 
intervention in the decision making process 
raised a difficult problem.  
 A set of measures is defined to reduce the 
vulnerability around the Seveso sites. The 
choice of the adequate measure is done in 
dialogue with different stakeholders on the 
basis of technical proposal. 
 
In what follow, we will first present the different 
steps of two separate processes that will end up by 
the publication of the two official documents that 
are the “Safety Study” (SS) and the “Technological 
Risk Prevention Plan” (TRPP). We will then pre-
sent the different difficulties faced when these two 
processes are put into practice. We will finely syn-
thesize the different difficulties and present some 
conclusions.  
1 ELABORATION PROCESS OF THE 
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 
The French law n° 2003-699 of July 30, 2003, re-
lating to "the prevention of the technological and 
natural risks and to the damages compensation", 
has introduce a distinction between the reduction of 
the risk to the source (hazard) and the urbanization 
control around Seveso sites. This distinction be-
came effective in two different procedures: the 
Safety Study (SS) and the Technological Risks 
Prevention Plan (TRPP).  
Both the SS and the TRPP are legal documents 
based on complex processes were different stake-
holders took part. These two processes are present-
ed next.  
1.1 The Safety Study (SS)  
The SS document aims at giving a report of the 
examination process carried out by the industrialist, 
in order to prevent and to reduce the risks of an in-
stallation or a group of installations, as much as 
technologically possible and economically accepta-
ble. These risks can be caused by products used, 
dependent on the processes implemented or due to 
the vicinity of other internal or external risks [4].  
The elaboration of the SS document is, in the 
majority of the cases sub-contracted completely at a 
engineering and design department. The SS is sel-
dom the work of the only industrialist who in al-
most all the cases helped by external specialists es-
pecially during the “risk analysis” and “risk 
modeling” phases presented below. 
The SS process is built around the following 
phases:  
1. Identification and characterization of the dan-
ger potentials. This phase aims at giving an im-
age of the chemical products, the processes and 
the reactions dangers produced by the industri-
alist’s installations. This is done according to 
the industrialist’s knowledge and can be possi-
bly enriched by information coming from the 
products suppliers, the processes licensors or 
coming from data- bases. 
2. Description of the environment. This phase is 
carried out by the industrialist or, generally, by 
an engineering and design department on the 
basis of information received from the various 
French Administrations (town council, DIREN, 
DDE, VNF, DRIRE…) and visual information. 
The principal objective is then to identify the 
vulnerable entities and the potential attackers in 
order to appreciate the potential gravity of the 
accidental scenarios generated by its installation 
and to identify, as well as possible, the acci-
dental scenarios whose origin is an external site 
aggression. 
3. Reduction of dangers potentials. The industrial-
ist must carry out a technico- economic exami-
nation aiming either at (i) removing or at substi-
tuting to the processes and/or the dangerous 
products, processes or products presenting less 
dangers, or at (ii) reducing as much as it is pos-
sible the quantities of dangerous matters 
blamed 
4. Assessment of the consequences of dangers ma-
terialization. This phase aims at determining, 
for the Administration, dangers distances with 
an aim at establishing the Particular Interven-
tion Plans (PIP). For that purpose, specialists in 
accidental scenarios modeling are involved. 
These specialists must make a choice and estab-
lish assumptions on the industrialist procedure 
with the assistance or not of a engineering and 
design department. The modeling specialists 
can belong to industry site, but generally, they 
came form an engineering and design depart-
ment, or of specific services of the industrial 
group to which the site belongs. 
5. Listing of accidents and incidents that have oc-
curred. This phase consists in establishing an 
experience feedback on the accidents and inci-
dents, which have occurred on the factory site. 
To this end, the industrialist, or the employed 
engineering and design department, must iden-
tify all the accidents or incidents that have oc-
curred on his site or on an other sites imple-
menting similar installations, similar products 
or similar installations. The industrialist can use 
his own database, or the database of the indus-
trial group to which it belongs, quasi- systemat-
ically the ARIA BARPI1 data base and in some 
cases trade associations data bases.  
6. Preliminary evaluation and detailed risks re-
duction study. This phase proceeds in four 
times. Initially, an exhaustive identification of 
the whole major accidents scenarios that can be 
generated by an installation is carried out. This 
work, which constitutes the heart of the SS, 
must be performed in a working group by im-
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plementing a risks analysis method. The work-
ing group is generally performed by the follow-
ing stakeholders: specialists in various disci-
plines (Safety, maintenance, exploitation, 
instrumentation, processes, …),  an organizer 
that is specialist in risk analysis methodologies 
and a technical secretary. In the majority of the 
cases, the specialists belong to the personnel of 
the site while the organizer and the technical 
secretary come from an engineering and design 
department. In the second time, a quotation of 
the whole identified of major accidental scenar-
ios is carried out. This quotation consists in 
evaluating the gravity as well as the probability 
of occurrence of the scenarios by taking into 
account the organizational safety and technical 
barriers set up by the industrialist to avoid the 
occurrence of a done scenario. This quotation 
can be done according to two approaches: qual-
itative, in analysis of the risks working group, 
or quantitative starting from information com-
ing from databases. In the third time, the owner 
must ensure himself of the acceptability of the 
risk induced by each identified scenario. For 
that purpose, it takes support on a “criticality 
grid” (Figure 1). The determination of the level 
of acceptability is the responsibility for the in-
dustrialist. To finish, the industrialist must 
prove that he has reduced or maintained his 
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Figure 1.  Criticality grid (probability / gravity) 
7. Quantification and hierarchization of the vari-
ous scenarios. This phase, which is the last of 
the SS, consists: (i) in a hierarchization of the 
whole identified major accidental scenarios ac-
cording to their gravity, their probability and 
their kinetics; (ii) in an quantitative evaluation 
of their consequences. Due to the significant 
number of the identified scenarios (in the pre-
ceding phase), the industrialist is obliged to 
identify and select the scenarios, considered as 
representative, for which a quantitative estimate 
of the distances from effects will be carried out. 
This work is carried out by the industrialist 
with the assistance of internal or external spe-
cialists (engineering and design departments in 
general). The quantitative estimate of the ef-
fects distances associated with these scenarios 
is carried out by modeling specialists. These 
specialists are internal or external to the indus-
trial site or group.  
 
The Administration, mainly represented by its Con-
trolling Authority the “Direction Régionale de 
l'Industrie” (DRIRE), must make sure that the in-
dustry site known as "SEVESO high threshold" 
perform a SS that correspond to what is 
reglementary fixed. A third expertise done by an 
engineering and design department is performed to 
verify the validity and the quality of the SS accord-
ing to the reglementary criteria.  
1.2 The Technological Risk Prevention Plan 
(TRPP)  
The TRPP aims at reducing the vulnerability 
around the Seveso sites notably by reducing vulner-
ability of the stakes. This consists in choosing a 
proportional risk reduction measure for urbaniza-
tion control around Seveso sites. These measures 
refer concretely to a legal risk zoning which high-
lights the "zones" which would present the highest 
levels of risk according to the vulnerability of the 
stakes around the site. Crossing the hazard map and 
stakes map allows to make a first proposal of a set 
of measures for risk reduction.  
Theses measures, proposed by technical experts, 
consist in three urbanization constraints: expropria-
tion, renunciation and pre-emption zones.  
The TRPP relate to "foreseeable technological 
events" and is not properly speaking an urban plan-
ning documents. But its must be taken into account 
in Local Urbanization Plans and aims at a stronger 
implication of the various actors concerned by risk 
prevention. 
The Technological Risk Prevention Plans 
(TRPP) is structured around three important parts: a 
technical part, a regulation part, and a communica-
tion part.  
Technical part of the TRPP





































































































The technical part of the TRPP includes (i) in-
formative maps (can come from the SS), (ii) a haz-
ard map, (iii) a stakes map [5]. 
The “hazard map” is elaborated by the control 
authority (DRIRE) using information coming from 
the SS documents. The following criteria are con-
sidered: intensity, probability and kinetic. The “in-
tensity and “probability” criteria are fixed by the 
Authority in decrees.  
The intensity criterion corresponds to three 
thresholds that delimit the four hazard levels to 
three categories of effects (Toxic, overpressure and 
thermic): significant lethal effects threshold, first 
lethal effects threshold and irreversible effects 
threshold. The French threshold levels are synthe-
sised in the following table [6]: 
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The qualitative probability criterion is defined 
according to the following information: data on ac-
cident causes, data on the safety barriers in place. 
These information are combined according to a 
multiple-steps method. The method suggested con-
sisted in identifying the various major accidental 
scenarios and the various safety barriers installed. 
The method used indications on the frequency of 
the initial events and criteria to characterise the bar-
riers (effectiveness, response time, Safety Integrity 
Level) [7]. 
The kinetic criterion helps to consider the possi-
bility of putting at the shelter the population ac-
cording to the evolution of the accidental scenario. 
This criterion is defined using the following infor-
mation: response time of the safety barriers, preven-
tion and protection measures inside or outside the 
industrial site considering the scenario kinetic [8]. 
The “vulnerable stakes map” (Figure 3) is elabo-
rated by the “Direction Départementale de 
l’Equipement” (DDE) using a three steps method:   Identify all the stakes (building and infrastruc-
ture) under the TRPP perimeter. 
 Estimate the vulnerability of the identified 
stakes.   Define a Technical- economic study to identify 
the stakeholders (operating, local authorities, 







Figure 3. Vulnerable stakes map 
The risk map is the result of hazard map and 
stakes map crossing. 
The TRPP regulation map (zoning) uses the 
technical zoning proposal done by technical ex-
perts. This regulation map must consider local con-
strain. A local committee named  “Local Committee 
of Information and Dialogue” (LCID) [9] is in 
charge of carrying the local acceptability of the 
vulnerability reduction measures.  
The communication part of the TRPP starts at 
the first stage of the technical part and continues 
during the validation of the regulation map (Figure 
2). 
 
The TRPP aims at limiting the direct or indirect 
effects on public health and safety directly or by 
pollution of the medium of an accidental event ac-
cidents likely to occur in the installations at the ma-
jor risks being able to involve effects. This will 
consist in delimiting risks exposure perimeters ac-
cording to the nature, the intensity of the technolog-
ical risks described in the SS and the proposed pre-
vention measures.  
At the interior of the perimeters of exposure to 
the risks three types of zones are given according to 
the nature of the risks, their gravity, their probabil-
ity and their kinetics. These zones, respectively 
called zones of urban right of pre-emption, zones of 
renunciation and zones of expropriation, represent 
three constraints of urbanization with which are as-
sociated the financial mechanisms with adequate 
compensation (Figure 4).  
 Figure 4. Various zones defined within the framework of the 
Technological Risk Prevention 
Under perimeter delimited by the TRPP, the lo-
cal authorities can initiate three kinds of destructive 
mechanism that represent different financial com-
pensation to the local citizen:   Expropriation. This exceptional mechanism is 
chosen only if the population protection meas-
ures are too expensive to be locally used. Ex-
propriation requires, after the approval of the 
TRPP, the signature of a convention between 
the plant operator, the local authorities and the 
State, as well as a declaration of utility ease-
ment for the benefit local community (munici-
pality).   Renunciation. This solution is used only for 
the building and consists in the given possibil-
ity to the owner to “put in residence” the local 
authorities to acquire its good.   Pre-emption. 
The constructive mechanism, applied to the ex-
isting building, consists in a re-enforcement of the 
constructions that mean to reduce their vulnerabil-
ity.  
 
The different stakeholders involved in the SS 
and the TRPP processes face different problems 
that we will discuss in what follow.  
1 PRACTICAL PROBLEMS FACED DURING 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
REGLEMENTARY STUDIES  
The SS and the TRPP processes reveal decisional 
and expertise problems faced in practice. Due to the 
fact that the TRPP process is highly dependent on 
the SS one, we will insist on this last one. 
1.3 The Safety Study (SS)  
The preceding chapter reveals the reasons of the SS 
process complexity. In fact, the SS calls upon many 
competences and cannot be held without the pres-
ence of multidisciplinary knowledge. 
1.1.1 Identifying the right stakeholders  
Competences and knowledge necessary to the im-
plementation of the SS are generally brought by 
experienced people that share their knowledge ei-
ther individually, in quite special situations, or col-
lectively, in working group. 
A considerable part of competences and knowledge 
comes from the industrialist. Indeed, it is him who 
knows the best the installations and him that most 
precisely apprehends the situations of exploitation 
being able to be at the origin of a major accident. It 
is also in general him who follows the maintenance 
actions and which manages the modifications of its 
installations. Moreover, the SS is entirely of his re-
sponsibility and that why he is in-charge to provide 
his own risk acceptability definition. 
Let us note that in general, the industrialist calls up-
on external specialists (either specialized services 
coming from the industrial group, or an engineering 
and design departments) for the following aspects 
in the process: control of work, the animation of the 
risks analyses process during the meetings or the 
modeling of the accidental scenarios. 
According to the different possibility of involving 
interns actors as well as external actors necessary to 
the risk analysis process and according to the im-
portance of information which they will have to 
provide, it is necessary to make sure that all these 
actors have the right competence and the necessary 
experience. This implies that the industrialist must 
on one hand be able to identify various competenc-
es necessary to the SS and on the other hand to de-
termine the corresponding internal or external ac-
tors.  
However, the majority of the industrialists do not 
have a right vision of all the actors necessary to the 
development of a SS and it can happened moreo-
ver, that they use the available and not the appropri-
ate human resources. This is why, they often prefer 
to be advised by an engineering and design depart-
ments which they must also choose according to 
their competence in the required field. Thus, the 
difficulties are here to make sure that: 
 the industrialist has a right vision of the 
needed competencies and experience to 
elaborate the SS;  
 the industrialist lays out in-house or into 
external people answering these criteria.  
1.1.2 Representativeness of the selected stake-
holders  
The question “of the representativeness of the 
stakeholders in the risk analysis process” is raised 
when the stakeholders are selected. Indeed, the 
“risks analysis” working group must be able to 
identify the dangerous situations and to evaluate the 
risk level for each scenario. This evaluation is gen-
erally carried out in a qualitative way and depends: 
on the competence and the experiment of the stake-
holder, on the risk perception he has and on his atti-
tude with regard to the risk (risk aversion or risk at-
traction). Thus, it is important to consider the 
optimistic or pessimistic nature of the stakeholder 
during the risk analysis process: the optimistic one 
will have a tendency to underestimate the major ac-
cidental scenario risk level whereas a pessimistic 
one will over-estimate the risk level for a same sce-
nario.  
Moreover, two experts (stakeholders) having the 
same level of competence will never have com-
pletely the same experience and thus will not al-
ways put forth the same judgement compared to a 
given situation. Indeed, an operator, among several, 
who is the only one who have faced a specific dan-
ger situation, difficult to imagine, will easily identi-
fy this kind of accidental scenarios where the other 
operators would not be able to. 
1.3.1 Working group Decision-making  
One of the major difficulties faced during the deci-
sion-making phase occurred when divergences are 
noticed between the members of the “risk-analysis” 
working group. The risk analysis process, done in a 
working group, is the heart of the SS process where 
the organizer (leader) has to manage the different 
opinions of the stakeholders can diverge. These di-
vergences can have considerable consequences on 
the evaluation of the accidental scenarios risk level. 
Indeed, the risk level of the accidental scenarios can 
be considered as acceptable, for some group mem-
bers, and as unacceptable by the other group mem-
bers. Let us notice that in absence of consensus the 
risk analysis process can be completely invalidate.  
Let us notice that the presence of all the expected 
competence in the working group does not assure 
that these competences are really integrated during 
the risk analysis process. Indeed, some aspect can 
influence the behavior of a stakeholder in a group: 
the presence of a hierarchical superior stakeholder, 
the timidity of the individual or his mood during the 
meeting (eg. worried by other external subjects).  
Lets notice that it is difficult to consider and evalu-
ate the quality of the working group reflexions 
which can change from a risks analysis meeting to 
an other; this observation is transposable to the final 
reglementary SS document where a synthesis of the 
work done by the working group is presented. The-
se observations make it difficult to the control Au-
thority and to the “third expert” to estimate the 
quality of work carried out and present in the SS fi-
nal document.  
1.1.3 Definition of the risk acceptability and quo-
tation of the scenarios  
One of the principal objectives of the Safety Study 
(SS) is to present the industrialist’s demonstration 
of his site risks control. This demonstration is built 
on a level of risk acceptability fixed a priori by the 
industrialist. In the development process of the SS, 
the risk acceptability fixed by the industrialist is 
partly supported by the “criticality grid” (Figure 1). 
The “criticality grids” are built in the majority of the 
cases starting from the gravity scale and the proba-
bility (or frequency) scale. For each couple (level of 
gravity, level of frequency), the grid help to identify 
if the given scenario present an acceptable or unac-
ceptable risk level.  
Let notice that:  
 it seems difficult to conceive that an industrial-
ist can fix itself the rules in term of risk accept-
ability for situations which endanger the exter-
nal environment of the site as well as the site 
employee;  it is interesting to note that there is not com-
monly allowed rule which defines what is “an 
acceptable risk” and what are the representative 
criteria to judge of that;  in practice, only few industrialists present the 
way in which their “criticality grid” were built 
up and the acceptability fixed. It is often no-
ticed that the “criticality grid” is selected in non 
consistent manner by the industrialist (ex. a 
copy of an existing grid ).  
The quotation methods currently used by the indus-
trialists are centered on the acceptability of each 
identified major accidental scenario, without con-
sidering the aggregation of all the scenarios for a 
considered installation, a considered site or more 
largely of a considered country or an industrial 
group. Indeed, the “criticality grids” are all depend-
ent to a selected scenario and not to the whole of 
the major accidental scenarios. 
The questions raised are: 
- Is it acceptable on the site level to have 10, 100 
or 1000 major accidental scenarios considered 
individually as acceptable? And what about the 
cumulative of this scenarios? 
- It is acceptable, considering the safety strategy 
of the industrial site, to have a variation of the 
safety levels when considering a small site hav-
ing 10 identified major accidental scenarios and 
a large site having identified major accidental 
scenarios? 
- How to build a “criticality grid” (Figure 1) 
adapted to the industry site? 
Lastly, the “criticality grid» rests on probability and 
gravity scales which are as difficult to assess as the 
acceptability level. This difficulty is still present 
when it comes to choose the adequate method mak-
ing it possible to quote various scenarios and to 
manage the uncertainties inherent to the various ex-
isting methods. 
1.1.4 Technico-economic studies of risk reduction 
process  
In addition to having to make sure, within the 
framework of the SS, that the risks level of the ma-
jor accidental scenarios generated by the site instal-
lations are acceptable, the industrialist must on the 
one hand make a “technico-economic study” aim-
ing at reducing the danger potential, and on the oth-
er hand, to reduce his risks to a level “as low as rea-
sonably realizable”. These complementary concepts 
are completely subjective and very difficult to really 
implement in the SS. Indeed, these aspects are con-
sidered depending on the “free will” of the industri-
alist because no limits are fixed.   
1.4 Problems that can be faced during the TRPP 
The TRPP are currently in an “exploratory phase”. 
Indeed, de promulgation of the decree and of the 
methodological guide will fixe definitively the 
TRPP process and form. This chapter aims at re-
vealing problems that can be faced during the 
TRPP process.  
1.1.5 Technical part of the TRPP process 
The DRIRE is in charge of producing a hazard 
map during the technical phase of the TRPP. This 
map is done according to the information provided 
by the industrialist (scenarios coming from the SS 
that leave the site limits) and consist in a re-
qualification of the probability dimension, a re-
computation of the effects distances and an evalua-
tion of the kinetic dimension. This exercise raises 
the following problems:  
 The DRIRE must treat the SS and TRPP pro-
cesses differently, knowing that in the first pro-
cess the DRIRE has a “control” role and in the 
second process the DRIRE is in charge (active 
actor). The DRIRE must then avoid giving rec-
ommendation about the admissibility of the SS 
when involved in the TRPP process.  
 The aggregation of the three criteria probability, 
intensity and kinetics that qualify the major ac-
cidental scenarios can be considered in different 
manner to produce a hazard map. However, the 
choice of an aggregation approach can have an 
impact on the meaning and the nature of the 
hazard zoning.  
 The crossing of the hazard map provide by the 
DRIRE and the vulnerability map provided by 
the DDE. This crossing must help the selection 
of a set of appropriate measures (expropriation, 
renunciation, etc.) suggested to an open dia-
logue within the LCDI committee. Going ow-
ing to the fact that the technical phase must lead 
to recommendations and not to decisions (deci-
sions are done during the reglementary phase 
of the TRPP): which form must take these rec-
ommendations so as to take all the local con-
straints raised within the framework of the 
LCDI?  
1.1.6 Dialogue part of the TRPP process 
The reglementary phase of the TRPP becomes 
effective only after the communication phase 
(Figure 2). The communication phase consists part-
ly in a dialogue process done by the LCDI commit-
tee. The following questions can be raised: 
 How to take into account specificities of the lo-
cal constraints without challenging the tech-
nical recommendations? 
 How to take into account the heterogeneity na-
ture of the stakeholders in term of roles, func-
tions, training, etc.? This can be solved by pro-
posing a common glossary? 
 How to establish a conclusion (eg. Risk reduc-
tion measure) shared by the whole stakehold-
ers?   
 How as well as possible to help the Prefect and 
his representatives to take into account both the 
technical information and the LCDI opinions?  
CONCLUSIONS  
The Toulouse accident in September 2001 rep-
resents a turning point in the way technological risk 
prevention is currently taken in France.  
The Safety Study (SS) and the Technological 
Risks Prevention Plans (TRPP) are two official 
documents: the first one is old and the second one 
is new. However, when put into practice, the two 
respective processes reveal difficulties in the way 
decision and expertise situations are driven.  
This paper aims at bringing to the fore the vari-
ous problems faced during the different expertise 
and decision-making phases present upstream, dur-
ing and downstream the major accidental risks 
analysis process. The different problems were gath-
ered in three groups: 
 Actors Problematic:  Checking of the representativeness of the 
analysis of risk working group. Selection of 
the stakeholders. This allows to make it 
possible to see whether the given opinions 
are neither too optimists nor too pessimists.   Difficulties to integrate the different per-
ceptions and opinions of the various stake-
holders.   Complexity of the decision-making process 
based on the information and ending doc-
uments provided by the Administrations 
(DDE and the DRIR) and considering the 
opinions expressed by the dialogue com-
mittee LCDI.  
 Difficulties (to the Administration) to con-
sider the local territory specificity in a na-
tional process.   Management of the different roles played 
by the Administration (DRIRE) in both the 
SS and TRPP processes. 
 Information and knowledge problematic:  Presence of imperfect knowledge of the ac-
cidental phenomena and the various poten-
tialities of their occurrence.   Integration of the complexity of the various 
information at disposal such as the of Secu-
rity Management System (SGS in French), 
etc;   Difficulty of modeling the accidental situa-
tions and difficulties to identify completely 
their consequences. Limits of the calcula-
tion models. Difficulty of choosing the ad-
equate model, etc. 
 Identification and assessment problematic:   SS process revealed an important set of 
whole of choice phases carried out by the 
stakeholders: e.g. choice of the studied sce-
narios, identification of gravity and proba-
bilities levels for the whole scenarios, 
choice of effect distances, etc. The purpos-
es of these choices are to reduce the uncer-
tainty in a set of stakeholders conceded 
states. However, because of the strong ef-
fects of these "choices" on the industry risk 
control strategy and because of the strong 
overlap between SS and TRPP, it is neces-
sary to institute a set of control mechanisms 
to validate their relevance.   Identification of the unusual situations. 
How to identify the probability of rare sce-
narios  Difficulty of selecting the scenarios to be 
taken into account within the framework of 
the TRPP. 
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